Afghanistan as a Prism of Regional Stability

Pic: October 4, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Amir Khan Muttaqi on the sidelines of the 6th meeting of the Moscow Format of Consultations on Afghanistan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia.

The Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) Sri Lanka invited me as guest speaker on my chosen title, "Afghanistan as a Prism of Regional Stability."

I delivered an analysis of Afghanistan's contemporary geopolitical landscape, tracing its historical

evolution and examining the complex interplay between governance, regional dynamics, and international relations. My presentation explored the paradox of de facto authority existing without formal diplomatic recognition, and the growing pattern of transactional engagement by regional and global powers. The lecture further examined border security challenges, the role of regional mediation efforts, and the impact of shifting geopolitical alignments on Afghanistan's stability, and addressed the broader implications of these dynamics for South Asia, including indirect economic consequences relevant to Sri Lanka's energy security and trade dependencies.

The session concluded with an engaging question-and-answer segment, during which participants explored the strategic implications of the issues raised for Sri Lanka's national security and foreign policy positioning.

Executive Summary

On 1st September 2026, the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), Sri Lanka, hosted a lecture titled “Afghanistan as a Prism of Regional Stability”, delivered by Air Chief Marshal Gagan P. Bulathsinghala (Retd.). The session drew a distinguished audience from the Tri-Forces, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU), the Border Risk Assessment Centre (BRAC), the Army Maintenance Unit, and INSS staff, with extended participation via Zoom.

The address traced Afghanistan’s historical trajectory from its founding in 1747 through successive phases of foreign intervention, civil war, Taliban rule, and the post-2021 return of the Taliban to power. Central to the analysis was the paradox of de facto governance without de jure recognition, highlighting how regional and global powers increasingly engage Kabul through transactional ties trade, counterterrorism, migration while withholding formal diplomatic endorsement.

Below are the extracts of the full text of the address delivered.

To understand Afghanistan today, we must first understand the arc of history that brought it here.

Afghanistan was founded in 1747 by unified Pashtun tribes and remained under a British-constrained foreign policy from 1880 to 1919 as a buffer state that was never colonised. It gained true independence in 1919. Democratic progress was cut short by a 1973 coup and a 1978 communist countercoup, prompting the 1979 Soviet invasion and a decade of war until the USSR withdrew in 1989. Civil war followed until Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. After 9/11, a US-Allied-Northern Alliance coalition toppled the Taliban, but the peace that followed proved illusory: peace talks collapsed, NATO withdrew, and instability deepened until the Taliban retook power on 15 August 2021 a shift of far greater magnitude than anything before it.

Geographically, Afghanistan spans 652,230 sq km across 34 provinces, bordering six countries, and is home to a mosaic of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities alongside eleven smaller groups. It is against this history and diversity that today's question of recognition without legitimacy must be examined.

Legal status: unrecognised, but functioning as the government

The Taliban's post-2021 rule has now nearly matched their 1996–2001 tenure in length and exceeded it in internal control and de facto acceptance. Yet Russia remains the only state to formally recognise them; the US recognises no government of Afghanistan at all. This gap between de facto

governance and de jure recognition is deliberate and most capitals prefer transactional engagement (trade, counterterrorism, migration) over the cost of formal endorsement. The real analytical puzzle is this asymmetry: a regime treated as durable enough to negotiate with, but not legitimate enough to endorse.

Growing de facto acceptance without formal recognition

Iran, Uzbekistan, India, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and China have all deepened ties with Kabul with bilateral pacts, investments, diplomatic visits without formal recognition. China accredited a Taliban ambassador in December 2023 while denying this constituted recognition. This new wave of engagement is notably economic rather than political: Chinese mining and infrastructure interest, Gulf investment, and India's cautious consular reopening all point to a slow, commercially-driven normalisation that regional powers can plausibly deny as “recognition” even as it accumulates real weight.Governance structure The Taliban run a two-track system: Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada rules from Kandahar through the Shura-e Rahbari with de facto unlimited authority, while Kabul ministers serve as the executive arm.

The former republic's institutions, constitution, and legislature have all been dismantled. This bifurcation is structurally fragile: authority flows down from Kandahar, while the technocratic work of running the state customs, trade, humanitarian coordination falls to Kabul ministers who cannot easily influence the leadership above them. The system is built for doctrinal control, not administrative responsiveness, explaining both its durability and its brittleness under pressure.

Regional dynamic: the Pakistan-Afghanistan border

The 1893 Durand Line, drawn by Sir Mortimer Durand, split Pashtun tribal areas and remains unrecognised by Afghanistan as a legitimate border. Since Pakistani strikes in October 2025, the border has cycled through clashes and collapsing truces: a Qatar-Turkey brokered ceasefire in October, failed Saudi-mediated talks by year's end, renewed violence in December. Matters escalated sharply in February 2026 after a mosque bombing in Islamabad and a TTP assault in Bajaur triggered Pakistani strikes and Afghan retaliation. It worsened on 16 March when a Pakistani strike on a Kabul drug rehabilitation hospital killed at least 269 civilians (UNAMA) the deadliest such attack since 2021. UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, established by the UN Security Council in 2002 to support Afghanistan's government and people in rebuilding institutions, promoting human rights, coordinating humanitarian aid, and facilitating peace and development effort. An Eid ceasefire collapsed almost immediately; a China-brokered truce broke down within a month amid mutual accusations. China then hosted informal talks in Ürümqi (March/April 2026), where both sides agreed to “explore a comprehensive solution,” but fighting continued through April with no lasting resolution.

Notably, this repeated cycle — ceasefire, violation, mediation, relapse, four times in eight months has arguably strengthened the Taliban's position rather than weakened it. Each mediated truce has functioned as implicit international engagement, with Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and China treating the Taliban as a governing counterpart rather than an insurgency. The border war is quietly doing the diplomatic normalisation work that formal recognition channels have refused to do.

U.S. policy signal

“Afghanistan” appears in neither the 2025 National Security Strategy nor the 2026 National Defence Strategy, and as of February 2026 the State Department's Afghan policy review remained an “ongoing process” with no timeline. The UN assesses the Taliban face no meaningful armed or political challenge, though officials warn of “increasing control... without a clear end-state.” No government, including Muslim-majority states, has formally recognised the Emirate. Domestically, cracks are real: reporting points to fractures between Akhundzada's hardline Kandahar circle and pragmatist Kabul ministers, with leaked audio of Akhundzada himself warning of internal collapse. Humanitarian need remains severe 21.9 million requiring assistance in 2026, nearly 5.9 million returnees since 2023, up to 2.8 million more possible this year and restrictions on women and girls continue unchanged, now in a fifth year. Afghanistan's absence from Washington's strategy documents signals deprioritisation, not neutrality a vacuum China, the Gulf, and Russia have moved to fill on their own terms.

How the wider Middle East conflict connects in

The region is juggling overlapping fronts: the Iran-Israel-US war (from February 2026 strikes on Iranian sites), Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Houthi shipping attacks with Kushner shuttling to revive a Gaza ceasefire Israel has rejected. The Afghanistan linkages are indirect but real: Refugee flows: returns from Iran and Pakistan compound Afghanistan's humanitarian burden, likely worsening as Iran's own capacity shrinks under war. Regional militant ecosystem: Afghanistan sits within a wider arc alongside the Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” and TTP/Taliban dynamics distinct but related pressures on the same neighbouring states. Energy and shipping disruption: low Hormuz traffic and Gulf attack risk push up global energy and shipping costs relevant to South Asian economies, including Sri Lanka's import bill. Diplomatic bandwidth: with mediators absorbed by Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon, Afghanistan's own crises get comparatively less high-level attention.

Together these channels compound Afghanistan's marginalisation: diplomatic bandwidth is consumed elsewhere precisely as humanitarian pressures rise, while the regional militant ecosystem gives outside powers more reason to treat Kabul as a security partner than a rights concern.

Iran talks sticking points: Iran wants guarantees against future aggression, recognition of its “legitimate rights,” reparations, and a new Hormuz transit-charge regime (opposed by Oman and the US) while ruling out any discussion of its missile programme. Trump's 10 August demand for compensation set back momentum; talks have “faltered.” Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has reshuffled military command and not appeared publicly since succeeding his father. Israel, party to the initial strikes but not the talks, means a US-Iran deal wouldn't resolve the Gaza/Lebanon conflict. Net read: renewed open war looks avoidable near-term, but durable peace looks distant more rolling ceasefire than end-state.

Afghanistan's own toll: at least 289 civilian casualties since 26 February (76 killed, 213 injured), over 115,000 displaced, schools and trade routes shut. A full-scale war remains unlikely, but the underlying Durand Line/TTP dispute is unresolved, so one has to expect continued flare-up rather than resolution.

Energy-price angle

This is the most consequential thread for Sri Lanka: roughly 84% of Hormuz crude and 83% of LNG flows were Asia-bound even pre-war. The IEA's August 2026 report cuts 2026 demand growth by 1.6 million barrels/day (510,000 more than last month), as high fuel prices and the closed Strait suppress consumption. Supply is down 4.3 million barrels/day to ~102 million, with

8.3 million/day of Gulf output still offline; fresh July-August fighting cut the Q3 forecast by another 1.7 million barrels/day. Prices have swung widely Hormuz tanker traffic initially fell 90%, pushing oil above $100; it eased to

~7% above pre-war by mid-June; $200 scenarios were floated at the worst point; prices climbed again in early August on fresh Iranian demands. Current levels: Brent ~$90–91, WTI ~$85–86. Beyond oil, curtailed associated gas output is hitting Asian/European spot gas prices, with fertiliser supply chains especially exposed given Gulf gas dependence a real risk to Sri Lanka's current account and food inflation.

Mecca Joint Defence Agreement

On 7 August 2026 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan (MBS, Erdoğan, Shehbaz Sharif) signed a NATO Article 5-style pact an attack on one is an attack on all building on the bilateral Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement of 17 September 2025. Turkey's accession doesn't breach NATO law, but creates entanglement risk: two independently-negotiated mutual-defence commitments with no mechanism to resolve conflicts between them. The pact responds to fears of a Gulf security vacuum amid the US-Iran conflict, but analysts caution it lacks a joint command, standing forces, or trigger mechanism, and its text remains unpublished more political symbolism than operational substance, for now. A pointed historical echo: the 1979 US-Saudi-Pakistani axis that armed the mujahideen against the USSR produced consequences including networks that led to 9/11 its architects never foresaw. Tools built for one purpose outlasted their original conflict. The Mecca pact's silence on Afghanistan doesn't guarantee that it stays confined to its stated Iran/Houthi scope which indefinitely is a reason for vigilance, not reassurance.

For the Afghanistan prism framing

Taken together: the Taliban regime that has achieved something short of recognition but functionally equivalent to acceptance, sustained by accumulated transactional engagement rather than legal legitimacy. Yet this sits on unstable ground as the border war cycles without resolution because its root cause (the Durand Line, TTP sanctuary) has no negotiated path forward; internal Taliban fractures, humanitarian crisis, and a Middle East conflict absorbing regional diplomatic bandwidth compound the instability. The Mecca pact makes the pattern explicit: Riyadh's non-involvement in the border clashes, even while signing a mutual defence pact with Pakistan itself, confirms the “attack on one” clause is Iran/Houthi-focused, not meant to cover Pakistan's western frontier is clear evidence that Afghanistan remains regionally isolated even as neighbours build overlapping security architectures around it.

The core paradox for a “prism of regional instability” framing: Afghanistan's crises no longer produce urgency among its neighbours they are simply absorbed, managed, and deprioritised. A crisis that produces urgency invites intervention and eventual resolution; a crisis merely absorbed into the background can persist indefinitely, precisely because it no longer alarms anyone enough to act.

Manage neglect calls for deliberate engagement over drift. Start by depoliticising the border dispute replacing episodic ceasefires with joint monitoring, TTP intelligencesharing, third-party verification, and building on Ürümqi rather than repeating it.

The recognition-or-nothing binary has already been overtaken by events given the existing patchwork of de facto ties; a coordinated framework offering conditional, functional recognition tied to counterterrorism cooperation and incremental rights progress would give outside powers real leverage where blanket withholding has not. Since the Mecca pact won't cover Afghanistan, a dedicated security mechanism is needed with China and Qatar more realistic anchors than Riyadh or Ankara. This should pair with pre-positioned humanitarian financing, as Iranian and Pakistani returnee flows are set to worsen. Finally, regional actors should watch the Kandahar-Kabul fracture closely arguably a bigger wildcard than the border war with contingency plans ready this time, unlike in 2021. Any functional-recognition framework must also address the Kandahar-Kabul asymmetry directly: incentives aimed only at Kabul technocrats risk being overridden by Kandahar at will. Durable engagement likely requires two parallel channels, one economic, aimed at the pragmatists running the state day to day, and the other, reputational/security-based, aimed at the hardline core that holds final authority rather than a single track that assumes the two audiences are the same.

Closing Remarks

As we reflect upon Afghanistan's turbulent journey, let us recognise that its story is not merely one of borders and battles, but of resilience tested against the weight of history. Afghanistan today stands as a prism through which the fragility and endurance of regional stability are revealed. Its paradox of governance without recognition, its cycles of conflict and mediation, and its silent toll upon ordinary lives remind us that instability, when absorbed rather than resolved, becomes a permanent scar upon the region.

For Sri Lanka, the lesson is profound. Though we stand far from the Hindu Kush, the tremors of Afghanistan reach our shores through energy markets, trade dependencies, and the shifting currents of diplomacy. We cannot afford complacency. Stability is not inherited; it is cultivated through foresight, cooperation, and principled engagement. As stewards of our nation's security and foreign policy, we must embrace the responsibility to anticipate, adapt, and act with clarity of purpose.

In the final measure, Afghanistan's experience calls us to vigilance. It reminds us that the strength of a nation lies not only in its defences, but in its wisdom to engage constructively with the world around it. May Sri Lanka, in its own journey, continue to uphold the values of service, integrity, and resilience ensuring that our island remains not a passive observer of regional tides, but an active architect of stability in the Indian Ocean order.

Air Chief Marshal Gagan Bulathsinghala (Rtd) RWP RSP VSV USP MPhil MSc FIM ndc psc. Senior Fellow South Asia Foresight Network, Director Strategic Development WKV Group, Director Khen Energy, Immediate Past President Association of Retired Flag Rank Officers, Formerly Commander Sri Lanka Air Force, Ambassador to Afghanistan

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